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ABSTRACT 
The judicial cooperation in the field of private law is a real success story in the European 
Union. The current regulatory system of EU law does not aim to unify procedural law; the 
Member States have autonomy to establish their own procedural rules (principle of national 
procedural autonomy). The Court of Justice of the European Union may subordinate this 
freedom to an examination based on the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. The rule 
of a Member State’s procedural autonomy may clash with the matter of the “act of its own 
motion” (ex officio) mechanism of the application of EU law. The question is where we can 
find the borderline between the ex officio mechanism and the principle of national procedural 
autonomy if the private individual party wants to enforce his claims based directly on EU law 
in front of the court of the Member State. 
 
ABSTRAKT 
Súdna spolupráca v oblasti civilného práva je úspešným príbehom v Európskej únii. Súčasný 
regulačný stav práva únie neumožňuje dospieť k záveru o existencii jednotnotného procesné-
ho práva; totiž členské štáty majú autonómiu prijímať vlastné procesné pravidlá (princíp ná-
rodnej procesnej autonómie).  Súdny dvor Európskej únie môže túto slobodu podriadiť pre-
skúmaniu založenému na zásadách rovnocennosti a účinnosti. Pravidlo autonómie členského 
štátu je tiež striktne ovladané mechanizmom „konania na základe vlastného podnetu“ (ex 
officio). Tento koncept je skutočným pravodlom procesnej autonómie vzťahujúcej sa 
k vymáhaniu nárokov založených na európskej regulácii. Otázkou je: kde je možné najš hra-
ničnú čiaru medzi ex officio mechanizmom a princípom narodnej procesnej autonómie 
v prípade aj súkromná osoba chce vymáhať svoje nároky priamo z práva EU pred súdom 
členského štátu. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Judicial cooperation in law making on the terrains of private law is a real success story in 
the European Union, which is clearly demonstrated by the sheer number of EU norms adopted 
in this particular field of law.  This legislation is still one of the most dynamically evolving 
fields of law of the European Union at present, in other words it’s “flagship”. From the per-
spective of law-making, the most significant step was the “communitarisation”1 of the legal 
field, which was induced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, and  law-making has been strenuously 
                                                 
1  This is how the progression can be called, while after the adoption of the legal field into the regulation spectrum of the 
Union, it became possible to regulate it directly by legal sources of the EU. 
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advancing  ever since. A due consequence of this is that the former legislation, governed 
mostly by international agreements, is being replaced by and in certain fields complemented 
by secondary EU norms, primarily by regulations. 
The majority of EU norms are of procedural nature;
2
 today we can find fewer norms that 
regulate questions of substantive law.
3
 Yet it can well be observed as a tendency, that recently 
in the course of law making it is legal sources of a complex nature that have gained suprema-
cy, which means that a comprehensive set of rules applicable to procedural law matters (pri-
marily jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments) and substantive law matters 
(primarily the applicable law) relating to a given topic shall be set in the same legal 
norm/source.
4
 It marks a peculiarity of the harmonisation of the procedural law that EU legal 
sources are also created to cover numerous technical questions (e.g. rules on the application of 
standard forms
5
) as well.  Another peculiarity comes from the fact that several Member States 
have added opt-out and opt-in reservations to the judicial cooperation in civil matters,
6
 thus 
the declarations, provisions and agreements made in this field are also all enrichment to the 
body of legal sources.
7
 Moreover, the option of enhanced cooperation must be considered as 
well in this particular area.
8
  
Finding the governing rule that applies in a given case and finding the applicable rules 
among those many is not any easy task, since along with the rejoicing increase in the number 
of EU sources of law, and thus the gradual expansion of regulatory areas,  agreements of the 
Member States on mutual legal assistance between themselves,
9
  international agreements in 
force between the European Union and other organisations,
10
 and the norms of the European 
Union  – and in particular those  on the designation of authority –  relating to international 
treaties
11
 have a significant role  in the application of the law. 
The situation is shaded by the fact that while some sources of EU law do not require any 
connecting regulation from either a domestic or an EU law perspective, others do assign to the 
Member State either an explicit or an implicit regulatory authority. The two  categories can be 
distinguished  by the intention of the EU law-maker to define the degree of autonomy of the 
Member State as either in an auxiliary matter, reducing the freedom of the Member State to 
the implementing measures 
12
 or in the absence  of a comprehensive regulation, the Member 
                                                 
2  See e.g. themes of jurisdiction, taking of evidence, transmission of documents, and exemption from court fees. 
3  Mainly the rules relevant to the applicable law regulating competing/colliding situations.  
4  Such as e.g. Regulation (EU) No 650/2012; Regulation (EC) No 4/2009.  
5  See e.g. 2004/844/EC: Commission Decision; 2005/630/EC: Commission Decision. 
6  The United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark annexed a protocol to the Treaties of Amsterdam and Lisbon, in which they 
excluded themselves from the authority of acts to be determined for the future in the area of freedom, security and law. 
7  See e.g. In accordance with articles 1 and 2 of protocol no.: 22 on the situation of Denmark, Denmark did not participate 
in the adoption  of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012, yet in accordance with paragraph (2) of article 3. of the agreement be-
tween Denmark and the EU, Denmark briefed the Commission on 20th December 2012 in a letter upon it’s decision to 
implement  the provisions stipulated  in Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012;  2009/26/EC: Commission Decision of 
22 December 2008 on the request from the United Kingdom to accept Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European 
Parliament and the Council on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I);  2009/451/EC: Commission Deci-
sion of 8 June 2009 on the intention of the United Kingdom to accept Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 on jurisdiction, 
applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations.  
8  See e.g. Regulation (EU) 2016/1103; Regulation (EU) 2016/1104. 
9  See e.g. Regulation (EU) 1215/2012/EU articles 71-73. 
10  See e.g. the Protocol on the Law Applicable to Family Maintenance Obligations as of the 23 November 2007 Hague 
Protocol). 
11  See e.g.: 2008/431/EC: Decision; Regulation (EC) No 662/2009; Regulation (EC) No 664/2009; 2011/220/EU: Council 
Decision of 31 March 2011 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of the Hague Convention of 23 November 
2007 on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance; 2011/432/EU: Council 
Decision of 9 June 2011 on the approval, on behalf of the European Union, of the Hague Convention of 23 November 
2007 on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance 
12  Such as e.g. in the case of Rome III., the possibility that the national law can determine the latest deadline to   which the 
parties may exercise their freedom of the choice-of-law, in terms of the regulation on inheritance for instance such as the 
freedom to determine the technical validity of the verbal last will. 
STUDIA IURIDICA Cassoviensia                               ISSN 1339-3995, ročník 6.2018, číslo 1 
26 
 
States shall retain their own regulative powers.
13
 If EU law does not completely extrude 
Member State regulation, in non-regulated matters, Member States may either adopt imple-
menting measures or adopt primary regulation in areas uncovered by EU law, by which the 
laws of the Member States may govern the procedural law matters in question. 
 
II. BASIC SCOPE OF THE ISSUE 
The procedural rules facilitating the enforcement of private claims can be classified in sev-
eral ways, along several criteria, and aligned by the above logic; several types of regulatory 
methods can be introduced both at an EU and at a Member State level. Since the majority of 
EU rules adopted so far are of procedural nature, several approaches have been developed for 
procedural cooperation between the Member States, and even the possibility of the unification 
of procedural law has arisen.
14
 There are also a number of procedural problems
15
 in the focus 
of interest of organizations examining procedural issues
16
. 
The counterpoint of the unification of procedural law is emphasized by the principle of the 
Member State’s procedural autonomy, the content of which is interpreted in different ways. 
The most extremist view is that the civil procedural law is not considered to fall within the 
regulatory framework of EU law.  However, the wording of the judgments of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) gives a more subtle wording. To be more precise, from 
the denotations of “in the absence of relevant (EU) provisions,” “in the absence of relevant 
EU (Community) rules,”17 and “where the area is not governed by EU (Community) law”18 it 
can be concluded that   civil procedural legislation is not the exclusive competence of the 
Member State.  
Moreover, it also refers to a certain extent of the regulation in EU procedural law that there 
are EU legal sources explicitly dealing with procedural matters (these can be regarded as rules 
of direct mutual legal assistance). 
Examples are: Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 November 2007 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudi-
cial documents in civil or commercial matters (service of documents), and repealing Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000; Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on 
cooperation between the courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or 
commercial matters; Council Directive 2002/8/EC of 27 January 2003 to improve access to 
justice in cross-border disputes by establishing minimum common rules relating to legal aid 
for such disputes. Nevertheless, a certain type of legal unification is targeted by those legisla-
tive techniques of the EU, which can lead to certain proceedings performed in accordance 
with the principles of the European Union, as well as the rules of the Member State. The two 
                                                 
13  As a “Remainder authority” in non-regulated matters of the legal sources, the possibility for the Member State to regulate 
is open. 
14  In 1987 a group of experts was formed, dedicated to work out the fundamental questions of the harmonisation of civil 
procedural law. The draft version of the directive created by the experts group was released in 1993, and it was here, 
where the concept of the “European Model Code Civil Procedure” was first introduced. 
15  In 2004, the ALI and the UNIDROIT adopted and jointly published the “Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure”. 
The very focus of the cooperation of ELI and UNIDROIT is the examination of the possibility of a standardized proce-
dural law regulation. The currently operating program is the “European Rules of Civil Procedure,” under which several 
project groups have been formed. 
16  Such organisations are for example the ALI (American Law Institute), the ELI (European Law Institute), and the UNI-
DROIT (The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law). 
17  Joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93. Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Bundesrepublik Deutschland and The Queen v Secretary 
of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others. ECLI:EU:C:1996:79. 
18  Joined cases 212 to 217/80. Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato v Srl Meridionale Industria Salumi and others; 
Ditta Italo Orlandi & Figlio and Ditta Vincenzo Divella v Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato. 
ECLI:EU:C:1981:270. 
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different regulatory patterns of judicial cooperation in civil matters can well be seen in the 
regulation so far. 
 First-generation sources can be considered the norms dedicated to facilitate cross-border 
disputes with EU rules  related to uniform  jurisdiction,  determining the choice of the appli-
cable law,  or which are aimed to provide  procedural  assistance (typically by directly appli-
cable regulations in order to provide  easier and unified  application),  
Compared to this, the “second generation” sources of law create such alternatives for the 
parties, by which they can access independent legal acts of a sui generis EU law (which are 
sometimes only ancillary) which, in addition to the legal possibilities of the Member States, 
allow them to pursue proceedings and make use of legal institutions based on EU law. 
The European order for payment (EOP) procedure can typically be regarded as one exam-
ple, which does not replace the payment order procedures pursued by the Member States, but 
provides additional options for parties to enforce their claims in cases including cross-border 
elements.  
The EU's legislative achievements along with guidelines given by the CJEUbased on the 
interpretations of the law are altogether inducing a standardised system in procedural rules in 
Europe. However, we should consider the concept of a school supported by legal literary re-
search, which aims to establish a concentrated, standardised European regulation compiled in 
one single legal source applicable in   legal disputes including cross-border elements. 
The jurisprudence of the CJEU in the field of freedom, security and justice has clearly 
highlighted the need for an autonomous EU terminology in procedural law. Procedural law 
can only serve the efficient protection of rights, if EU rules are uniformly interpreted. If there 
is need for an autonomous interpretation, there is a greater risk that national law enforcement, 
in violation of this rule, will interpret the specific legal instrument in a different way, in par-
ticular if a clear legal concept exists in the national legal system of the same name but with a 
different meaning. 
The proper interpretation of the EU rule will be lost in every such case even if the obliga-
tion to apply the relevant EU law is not violated, as the legal practice “purely” violates the 
principle of the priority of interpretation.
19
 The harmonisation measures taken so far are still 
not sufficient to ensure that legislation is legally unproblematic with respect to the safeguard-
ing of rights. The majority of the EU rules adopted till date have created a unified law, since 
regulations prescribe an obligation of direct application for the national legal practice. In the 
areas where ruling has been done by directives, the EU lawmaker   aims to create harmonized 
rules, primarily minimum conditions. However, the results of both regulatory techniques im-
plies  the free flow  of judicial judgments to the utmost, and the notions of mutual trust and 
mutual recognition, which have become the most essential principles in the harmonisation of 
law since the birth of the Cassis-concept
20
 .  
From the fact that the current regulation of EU law does not allow for the unification of 
procedural law it does not follow that there is no harmonization at all. In principle, Member 
States retain their autonomy with respect to the establishment of procedural rules, in other 
words in the case of a corresponding EU rule, their own rules of procedure apply, but in cases 
                                                 
19  See more details: GOMBOS, KATALIN: The Levels and Steps of the Judicial Protection Arising from the European Law. In: 
Ünnepi kötet Dr. Bodnár László egyetemi tanár 70. születésnapjára. (ed: BLUTMAN, LÁSZLÓ) Acta Universitatis Szege-
diensis. Acta Juridica et Politica, Tom. 77. Szeged: Szegedi Tudományegyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar, 2014. 123-
134. p. http://digit.bibl.u-szeged.hu/00000/00051/00442/juridpol_077.pdf 
20  Case 120/78. Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein.ECLI:EU:C:1979:42., yet on the basis of 
the product included in this case, only by Cassis de Dijon did the principle introduced by the judgment became famous as 
the, a “mutual recognition”, which, by now has made one of the key principles of  the harmonisation of law.  
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where the rights guaranteed by EU law are enforced before the courts of a Member State, the 
CJEU may examine this freedom based on the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.  
In such cases, an EU standard for procedural law is also valid if the specific procedural 
rules are governed by the law of the Member State. More precisely, individuals have the right 
to enforce their claims based directly on the EU law in front of their national courts as well.
21
 
Since the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, the Charter of Fundamental Rights has the same 
binding force as the Treaties, under Article 6 (1) of the Treaty on the European Union. Article 
47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights also defines the principle of effective judicial protec-
tion expressis verbis.  
Due to the principle of effective judicial protection and legal remedies, there are some sub-
stantive rules that can be deduced directly from EU law, yet   EU procedural rules are not or 
are not fully associated with the right to enforce claims. This all shall lead to the conclusion 
that if a private individual wishes to enforce his claims based directly on EU law before the 
national court of the Member State, then he shall adapt to national procedural laws, and can 
only refer to EU substantive law as the grounds of the claim. Nonetheless, content-wise the 
rules of national procedural autonomy may only mean that in the absence of a relevant EU 
regulation, procedural rules – with the limitations introduced by the CJEU – shall be governed 
by the national law.
22
 With regard to the rules of the Member State, it is an important princi-
ple that they may not be less favourable than those governing claims under domestic law (the 
principle of equivalence), and that national procedural rules may not render excessively diffi-
cult or practically impossible the exercise of the rights conferred by EU law (the principle of 
effectiveness).
23
 In other wording: in the absence of EU  regulation ,  procedural rules shall be 
governed by the national law of  the Member State on the basis of the principle of procedural 
autonomy, yet only on condition that these rules must comply with both principles of equiva-
lence and effectiveness.
24
 Furthermore, the Member State’s procedural autonomy shall also 
prevail if there are some given EU norms to a certain extent, but the detailed rules on the im-
plementation of these norms are governed by the domestic law of the Member State.
25
 The 
rule of a Member State’s procedural autonomy is also clashingly shaded by the matter of the 
“act of its own motion” (ex officio) mechanism.  
 
                                                 
21  Upon the matter of legal remedies comprehensively see: DOUGAN, MICHAEL: National remedies before the Court of 
Justice. Issues of harmonisation and differentiation. Hart Publishing, Oxford 2004. 
22  C-439/08. Vlaamse federatie van verenigingen van Brood- en Banketbakkers, Ijsbereiders en Chocoladebewerkers 
(VEBIC) VZW v Raad voor de Mededinging Minister van Economie. ECLI:EU:C:2010:739,   paragraph 63. 64. 
23  C‑ 378/07–C-380/07. Kiriaki Angelidaki (C-378/07), Anastasia Aivali, Aggeliki Vavouraki, Chrysi Kaparou, Manina 
Lioni, Evaggelia Makrygiannaki, Eleonora Nisanaki, Christiana Panagiotou, Anna Pitsidianaki, Maria Chalkiadaki, Chry-
si Chalkiadaki v Organismos Nomarchiakis Autodioikisis Rethymnis, and Charikleia Giannoudi (C-379/07), Georgios 
Karabousanos (C-380/07), Sofoklis Michopoulos and Dimos Geropotamou. ECLI:EU:C:2009:250, paragraph 159., C-
212/04. Konstantinos Adeneler and others v Ellinikos Organismos Galaktos (ELOG). ECLI:EU:C:2006:443, paragraph 
95., C-53/04. Cristiano Marrosu and Gianluca Sardino v Azienda Ospedaliera Ospedale San Martino di Genova e 
Cliniche Universitarie Convenzionate. ECLI:EU:C:2006:517, paragraph 52., C-180/04.  Andrea Vassallo v Azienda 
Ospedaliera Ospedale San Martino di Genova e Cliniche Universitarie Convenzionate. ECLI:EU:C:2006:518, paragraph 
37., C-364/07. Vassilakis Spyridon, Theodoros Gkisdakis, Petros Grammenos, Nikolaos Grammenos, Theodosios 
Grammenos, Maria Karavassili, Eleftherios Kontomaris, Spyridon Komninos, Theofilos Mesimeris, Spyridon Monastiri-
otis, Spyridon Moumouris, Nektaria Mexa, Nikolaos Pappas, Christos Vlachos, Alexandros Grasselis, Stamatios Kourtel-
esis, Konstantinos Poulimenos, Savvas Sideropoulos, Alexandros Dellis, Michail Zervas, Ignatios Koskieris, Dimitiros 
Daikos, Christos Dranos v Dimos Kerkyras. ECLI:EU:C:2008:346, paragraph 126. 
24  C‑ 470/12. Pohotovosť s. r. o. v Miroslav Vašuta, a Združenie na ochranu občana spotrebiteľa with the participation of 
HOOS. ECLI:EU:C:2014:101, paragraph 46. 
25  C-364/07. Vassilakis Spyridon, Theodoros Gkisdakis, Petros Grammenos, Nikolaos Grammenos, Theodosios Gram-
menos, Maria Karavassili, Eleftherios Kontomaris, Spyridon Komninos, Theofilos Mesimeris, Spyridon Monastiriotis, 
Spyridon Moumouris, Nektaria Mexa, Nikolaos Pappas, Christos Vlachos, Alexandros Grasselis, Stamatios Kourtelesis, 
Konstantinos Poulimenos, Savvas Sideropoulos, Alexandros Dellis, Michail Zervas, Ignatios Koskieris, Dimitiros Dai-
kos, Christos Dranos v Dimos Kerkyras. ECLI:EU:C:2008:346, paragraph 149. 
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III. CASE LAW AND CONCLUSIONS 
The CJEU in its joined cases of van Schijndel and van Veen no.: C-430/93. and C-431/93. 
26
 unequivocally acknowledged the boundaries marked by the peculiar features of national 
civil proceedings with respect to the ex officio examinations by national courts. This judg-
ment proclaimed that EU law  does not prescribe for the national courts to take into considera-
tion ex officio  the argument on the violation of EU norms in case the examination of this 
argument would oblige the courts to ignore  the binding force of the claim and to leave the 
boundaries  of the legal dispute as determined by the parties, by considering   facts and cir-
cumstances other than  those referred to by the claimant  whose interest would be the applica-
tion of the aforementioned regulations . 
In the judgment of the CJEU delivered in the case of Peterbroeck no.: C-312/93,
27
 the court 
concluded that in such cases, when the given national procedural provision makes the applica-
tion of EU law excessively difficult, the provision in question must be analysed with respect 
to the proceedings on the whole, and also with respect to the peculiarities of the national 
courts in their proceedings on different levels.    
Following the judgment made in the Peterbroeck case, in several cases the CJEU has re-
turned to emphasizing the principle of equivalence, which means that EU law does not impose 
a general duty on the courts of the Member State to apply EU law ex officio. Depending on 
the nature of the EU law provisions, they can be classified as either being or not being equiva-
lent to national rules of public policy when applying the law of the Member State, and accord-
ingly, bound by the procedural provisions of the Member State, it is either an obligation,
28
 an 
option or prohibited
 29
 for the courts of the Member State to “act of their own motion” (ex 
officio).  
As a main rule, EU law does not require the courts of the Member States to take into con-
sideration ex officio any legal grounds referring to the violation of EU provisions in court 
proceedings related to claims filed on the basis of EU substantive law, as it is not required 
either by the principle of equivalence or the principle of effectiveness.
30
 This  can be conclud-
ed from the fact that it is not contrary  to the principle of effectiveness if the national provi-
sion stipulates that the courts of the Member State may not “act of their own motion” (ex offi-
cio) when  referring to the  legal  grounds of a case based on the violation of  EU provisions in 
case the  examination of the legal grounds  would put the courts in a situation where  they 
would  abandon their passive role , they would have to go  beyond the ambit of the dispute 
defined by the parties  and would have to consider and rely on facts and circumstances other 
than those referred to by  the claimant. 
31
 
                                                 
26  Joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93. Jeroen van Schijndel and Johannes Nicolaas Cornelis van Veen v Stichting Pensi-
oenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten. ECLI:EU:C:1995:441. 
27  Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck, Van Campenhout & Cie SCS v Belgian State. ECLI:EU:C:1995:437. 
28  Case C-126/97. Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton International NV. ECLI:EU:C:1999:269, where the public policy 
status of the EU’s competition law became declared. 
29  Joined cases C-222/05 to C-225/05., J. van der Weerd and Others (C-222/05), H. de Rooy sr. and H. de Rooy jr. (C-
223/05), Maatschap H. en J. van ’t Oever and Others (C-224/05) and B. J. van Middendorp (C-225/05) v Minister van 
Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit. ECLI:EU:C:2007:318, where the non-public policy status of the EU’s provisions 
on foot-and-mouth disease were declared by the Court. 
30  Joined cases C-222/05 to C-225/05. J. van der Weerd and Others (C-222/05), H. de Rooy sr. and H. de Rooy jr. (C-
223/05), Maatschap H. en J. van’t Oever and Others (C-224/05) and B. J. van Middendorp (C-225/05) v Minister van 
Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit.  ECLI:EU:C:2007:318, paragraph 36. 
31  Joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93. Jeroen van Schijndel and Johannes Nicolaas Cornelis van Veen v Stichting Pensi-
oenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten. ECLI:EU:C:1995:441, paragraph 22. 
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The Océano Grupo case32 is a consumer protection case of particular interest in the juris-
diction of the CJEU, where the Court used a terminology and stronger means of expression 
different from its earlier practice, but later the Court turned to a more reserved style.
33
  The 
most convincing standpoint is which considers the validity of these decisions restricted to the 
given procedural legal context. A key element is that the consumer – either due to the provi-
sions of the law or unfair contractual terms – is legally or practically deprived of the possibil-
ity to file his complaint pertaining to the unfair contractual terms.
34
  However, some authors  
persuasively argue that since the walls of national procedural autonomy (e.g. respecting  the 
res iudicata principle) were not pulled down even within  the scope of the Océano Grupo case 
,
35
 the basic principles  laid down in  the Schijndel case were not overruled here, but indeed 
they became accurately specified  within a unique consumer protection context.
36
  
The Océano Grupo and the relevance of its derivative case law are both argued in terms of   
ordering proof ex officio. In addition, the different language versions of the Court’s judgment 
show diversity here. The German text (Befugnis von Amts wegen zu prüfen, ob die Klausel 
missbräuchlich ist) is open to the interpretation supporting the “act of their own motion” (ex 
officio) ordering  proof, as opposed to the English version  restricted to the notion of determi-
nation (to determine of its own motion). Both the Hungarian (hivatalból köteles vizsgálni) and 
the French versions (pouvoir d'examiner d'office le caractère abusif d'une telle clause) in 
themselves give way to multiple interpretations. In the absence of  unequivocal orders of the 
CJEU and  the unambiguous legal practice of  national authorities   it cannot  be stated  that 
EU law imposes an obligation on the courts of the Member State to  “act of their own motion” 
(ex officio) when ordering  proof in connection with  the unfairness of consumer contracts. 
Community Directive no.: 93/13/EEC does not regulate the burden of proof in general, only 
in clearly defined areas (e.g. in the area of proving the specifically discussed nature). 
In the case of VB Pénzügyi Lízing no.: C-137/08 related to the Directive37 the CJEU ex-
plicitly ordered the national court- on the basis of its obligations granted by the provisions of 
this Directive, to examine whether the given contractual term (the subject of the dispute) 
forming the base for the proceedings in progress before the court is under the scope of the 
Directive.
38
 It is also beyond debate that in special procedural law cases
39
 the national court 
can hold the obligation to evaluate the nature of the unfairness of contractual terms otherwise 
not complained by the consumer. Yet on the other hand, in the Invitel case no.: C-472/10, 
40
 
the CJEU proclaimed that at the examination of the unfairness of the disputed contractual 
term, the national court shall be obliged to consider all the terms of the contract included in its 
general terms and conditions, and beyond this general terms and conditions, all other possible 
rights and obligations as well, which are rendered by the national law. However, the afore-
mentioned judgment of the Court did not apply to the issue of  the “act of their own motion” 
(ex officio), so on the basis of the present case-law it is questionable, - even in the case of an 
                                                 
32  Joined cases C-240/98 to C-244/98. Océano Grupo Editorial SA v Roció Murciano Quintero (C-240/98) and Salvat Edi-
tores SA v José M. Sánchez Alcón Prades (C-241/98), José Luis Copano Badillo (C-242/98), Mohammed Berroane (C-
243/98) and Emilio Viñas Feliú (C-244/98). ECLI:EU:C:2000:346. 
33  I.e.:  Case C-473/00. Cofidis SA v Jean-Louis Fredout ECLI:EU:C:2002:705.; Case C-168/05. Elisa María Mostaza 
Claro v Centro Móvil Milenium SL. ECLI:EU:C:2006:675. 
34  CRAIG, PAUL – DE BÚRCA, GRÁINNE: EU Law – Text, Cases, and Materials, 5th ed. Oxford University Press, 2011, 233. 
p. 
35  Yet the substantial relativisation of the res judicata happened e.g. in: Case C-2/08. Amministrazione dell’Economia e 
delle Finanze and Agenzia delle entrate v Fallimento Olimpiclub Srl.ECLI:EU:C:2009:506. 
36  WHITTAKER, SIMON: Who Determines What Civil Courts Decide? Private Rights, Public Policy and EU Law. Oxford 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 46/2012; http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2118433.  
37  Case C-137/08. VB Pénzügyi Lízing Zrt. v Ferenc Schneider. ECLI:EU:C:2010:659, paragraph 49. 
38  Explicitly the examination of a single concrete term is included in several other cases e.g. in: Case C-618/10. Banco 
Español de Crédito SA v Joaquín Calderón Camino. ECLI:EU:C:2012:349. 
39  E.g. in the course of the examination of their competence. 
40  Case C-472/10. Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel Távközlési Zrt. ECLI:EU:C:2012:242. 
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evaluation from a consumer protection perspective- whether the obligation to evaluate by “act 
of their own motion” (ex officio) only applies to the given term exclusively, or it implies a 
more general requirement for  all judges when  examining  any contractual term in a consum-
er contract. The Court emphasized in case no.:  C-348/14. that upon  the examination of the 
unfairness of a single contractual term, the national judge shall be obliged to consider all the 
circumstances of entering into a  contract, which may  only be possible  if the judge  is famil-
iar with the entire content of the contract. However, not even this finding determines clearly 
the obligation to apply the principle of the binding force of the claim or the “act of their own 
motion” (ex officio) principle. .   
Based on the judicial practice of the CJEU – with peculiar sidesteps taken in the field of 
consumer protection – it appears that the principle of effectiveness does not impose a duty on 
Member State courts to consider legal grounds based on EU law by “act of their own motion” 
(ex officio) if the parties were given a genuine opportunity to refer to those legal grounds be-
fore a national court.
41
 Based on judicial practice till date it can be concluded that - with re-
spect to the principle of the binding force of the claim and due to  national procedural rules 
applicable in case of Member State autonomy- national  courts shall not hold the obligation to 
consider EU law by “act of their own motion” (ex officio)  in cases where  the parties were 
actually provided with the rights to file a claim before  a Member State court in relation to a 
violation  of their own substantive rights created by EU law. Nonetheless, it should be noted  
that currently  there are several claims before  the Court of Justice of the European Union re-
lated to  the principle of “act of their own motion” (ex officio), thus the issue is still at stake. 
A few more claims submitted in consumer protection matters may fit in these series,
42
 and the 
Court of Justice of the European Union will have the opportunity to develop its judicial prac-
tice in non-consumer protection matters
43
, which will obviously have an impact on both the 
legal practice and approaches in legal professional literature. 
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